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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Actions speak louder than words... 
Boris Labusov, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) press 
service, refrained from commenting on the recent arrests in Sweden and in the 
United States of persons suspected of spying for Russia. "We do not comment 
on such reports," he told Interfax. (INTERFAX, 1400 GMT, 20 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0220, via World News Connection) 
 
What may be indicative of Russia's attitude toward the West are two cases: 1.) 
Moscow's casual treatment of Andrey Knyazev, the Russian diplomat who fatally 
injured a Canadian woman while driving his car in Ottawa (he is being tried under 
article 264, part two of the Russian Criminal Code, violation of traffic and driving 
laws, punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, but there is no mention of 
manslaughter in the charges); 2.) the recent resumption of the case against 
Moscow Bauman University Professor Anatoly Babkin (accused of high treason 
in the form of espionage), earlier arrested in conjunction with Edmund Pope. 
(See THE NIS OBSERVED, 25 Oct 00, and 11, 29 Nov 00) (INTERFAX, 1321 
GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, and INTERFAX, 1224 GMT, 22 Feb 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0222, via World News Connection) 
 
Another such signal is an article that recently appeared in the government daily, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, detailing the allegedly harsh and gruesome experiences of 
a "heroic" Russian citizen whose name has been changed at her request. The 
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"completely unsuspecting St. Petersburg resident" supposedly was arrested, 
handcuffed, photographed, fingerprinted, exposed to "terrible" prison conditions, 
and shipped to Chicago to serve as a witness for a trial of a certain Galitsky who 
had worked in the US Consulate and helped Russians with a criminal past to 
leave illegally for the United States. In the second half of the article, however, it 
turns out that our heroine had left Russia for a job in Chicago, tracked down for 
her by a "very reliable person" who set her up with a "cover story" for entering the 
United States. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 13 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0213, via 
World News Connection) The hysterical tone of the article is almost comical 
when juxtaposed with all the information available on Russian prisons, where 
10,000 Russian prisoners die every year of hunger, tuberculosis and other 
illnesses -- more than 2,000 before their trials. (MAYAK RADIO, 1600 GMT, 22 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0222, via World News Connection) 
 
...but some words are still repeated 
On 22 February, at a ceremony marking the Day of the Defenders of the 
Fatherland, Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo pledged to bring the "anti-terrorist 
campaign in Chechnya to a logical end," and restore constitutional order, 
lawfulness and the functionality of all state institutions. (INTERFAX, 1050 GMT, 
22 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0222, via World News Connection) Grozny Mayor 
Beslan Gantimirov expressed his conviction that, with the transfer of control of 
operations to the Federal Security Service (FSB), this will, indeed, be done, given 
the different approaches and methods of the FSB. (INTERFAX, 0749 GMT, 22 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0222, via World News Connection) The primary goals, 
as specified by the chief of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, remain the same, 
however: destroying small bands, ascertaining the location of their leaders and 
"restoring order" in all settlements. (ITAR-TASS, 1239 GMT, 19 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0219, via World News Connection) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
YABLOKO, Communists express discontent 
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The central council of Russia's liberal political movement, YABLOKO, has been 
expressing its discontent with the government. Over the weekend of 17-18 
February it passed a resolution "On the relations between the YABLOKO 
association and the executive power," signed by the movement's leader, Grigori 
Yavlinsky. The main criticism concerns Russia's development as a "bureaucratic 
police state," and the tendency "to put all independent sources of criticism -- the 
parliament, mass media, political parties, and public organizations -- under the 
total control of the executive power." (INTERFAX, 0818 GMT, 19 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0219, via World News Connection) A statement issued on the 
following Tuesday (20 February) threatens Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's 
government with a vote of no confidence if a number of liberalization steps are 
not taken. (INTERFAX, 1843 GMT, 20 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0220, via World 
News Connection) In fact, a proposal for a no confidence vote was put forward -- 
by the Communist faction of the State Duma, but Duma Speaker Gennadi 
Seleznev dismissed it as premature. (ITAR-TASS, 0959 GMT, 20 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0220, via World News Connection)  
 
REGIONS 
A demonstration of Putin's vertical power 
In the Maritime Territory the demonstration of Putin's extension of vertical power 
continued. By 15 February, acting Maritime Territory Governor Valentin Dubinin 
and his deputies divided up responsibilities among themselves. The acting 
governor will be in charge of the local directorate of internal affairs, the justice 
directorate, the audit-and-inspection directorate, the Regional Energy 
Commission, the Mobilization Department, the Monitoring Directorate, and the 
territory's representative office within the Russian government structure. The 
deputy governors (6 remain of the original 13, but 2 more are to be appointed in 
the near future) will gain additional responsibilities. (RIA, 0319 GMT, 15 Feb 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0215, via World News Connection) Also, the responsibilities of 
the four deputies of the Russian president's plenipotentiary envoy to the Far East 
Federal District, Konstantin Pulikovsky, have been identified: Acting First Deputy 
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Governor Gennadi Apanasenko will assist in drafting the Maritime Territory 2001 
budget and exercise control over the spending of federal transfers to the 
Maritime Territory; Acting Deputy Governor Yuri Averyanov will deal with 
personnel management in the governor's staff and new appointments to city and 
district administrations (the Soviet term "cadres" comes to mind); Acting Deputy 
Governor Yuri Obryagin will supervise the Maritime Territory law-enforcing 
bodies together with the chief federal inspector for the Maritime Territory, Pavel 
Lysov; and Acting Deputy Governor Mikhail Arkhipov will supervise the local 
state media. Pulikovsky coordinated that distribution of authority with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. (RIA, 0356 GMT, 13 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0213, via 
World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Cairo: Courtesies belie tensions in rocky US-Russian relationship 
After weeks of diplomatic and military posturing, US-Russian relations assumed 
a less acerbic manner as US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met for the first time in Cairo. But beyond a vague 
agreement to work together for international security through continued dialogue, 
differences remain. 
 
Without a formal agenda, the Cairo meeting presented more of an opportunity for 
the sides to sound each other out in the face of mounting tensions than a real 
policy discussion. Powell reiterated US criticisms of Russian weapons 
proliferation to countries of concern such as Iran, Iraq, China, DPRK and India, 
while Ivanov stressed the need to find "points of coinciding interests." (CNN 
TONIGHT, 2008 GMT, 24 Feb 01; via lexis-nexis) However, only a week after 
Russia formally floated its National Missile Defense (NMD) counterproposal -- a 
vaguely defined non-strategic, mobile, European defense shield -- the sides 
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agreed in Cairo to reconvene working groups of specialists and discuss both 
offensive weapons and defensive systems. 
 
US shows foreign policy savvy in the face of the Russian counterproposal 
In a diplomatic maneuver revealing the insight of the Bush foreign policy team, 
the US has cited the Russian plan as evidence that Moscow accepts the 
existence of the type of danger NMD is meant to counter. By taking this stance, 
the US has highlighted a contradiction in Russian policy, resulting from Moscow's 
consistent denial of a missile threat from rogue states. The Russian proposal -- 
characterized by Powell as merely "interesting" (LOS ANGELES TIMES, 25 Feb 
01; via lexis-nexis) -- clearly represents Moscow's way of trying to ensure its 
inclusion in arrangements concerning a US missile defense system and 
preserving its own prestige as a maker of international arms control policy. 
 
US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained US thinking in the 
days leading up to Cairo: "What I think we're hearing [from Russia] is an 
admission that there's a threatthat might be addressed by missile defense." 
(REUTERS, 22 Feb 01; via lexis-nexis) If so, this is a diplomatic win for 
Washington. However, Rice admitted that the proposal does not mean Russia 
has changed its tone or that the US and Russia will be able to resolve their 
differences easily.  
 
Rough US-Russian relations precede Cairo 
As if to remind the US of the importance of arms control, Russia conducted a 
timely test of sea-based, land-based and air-based strategic weapons on 16 
February. The nearly simultaneous launches began with an SLBM launched from 
a submarine in the Barents Sea, followed by two ICBMs launched from the air by 
a Bear-11 bomber and from land by Russia's premier SS-27 Topol-M road-
mobile missile. (MILITARY NEWS AGENCY, 16 Feb 01; via RussiaToday.com) 
Although the Russian defense ministry confirmed that the test firing had been 
planned far in advance, the timing of the launches sent a strong signal about 
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Russian strategic capabilities on the eve of its NMD counterproposal and only 
days before Powell and Ivanov met. In addition, the launches, when coupled with 
Moscow's counterproposal and continued harsh anti-NMD rhetoric, suggest that 
Russia is grasping for means to renew its fading prestige. 
 
Russia accompanied military posturing with diplomatic maneuvering meant to 
downplay the rogue threat against which the US NMD is meant to safeguard. 
Russia has recently announced meetings with a variety of states -- including Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, India, and China -- all of which have been singled out by the 
US as threats to international security. During a high-level military meeting in 
Moscow, Russian and Chinese officials indicated that their countries are taking 
steps to counter a US NMD when it is fielded. In short, if the US abrogates the 
ABM treaty, China and Russia will work together to improve Chinese nuclear 
missile technology, according to unidentified officials quoted by the Russian 
press. (VREMYA, 22 Feb 01; via Johnson's Russia List) Even in light of these 
agreements, Russia maintains that a missile threat as a result of weapons 
proliferation does not exist. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev has called 
US claims that Russia is supplying rogue nations with nuclear technology 
"rubbish." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 15 Feb 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Meanwhile, Washington clearly is emphasizing its independent national security 
policy. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 14 Feb 01) "America will set its own foreign 
policy priorities," President Bush reiterated in recent remarks. (REUTERS, 16 
Feb 01; via lexis-nexis) The most telling sign of his seriousness is the manner in 
which the Bush administration has avoided significant engagement with Russia 
while still formulating its policy. Although the sides agreed to resume arms 
control and START-II talks at Cairo, no firm dates have been set for this or any 
other US-Russian exchanges. The first opportunity that the US and Russian 
presidents will have to meet face to face will not occur until the July G-8 meeting 
in Italy. Eventually the sides may come to the table, but it is clear from 
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Washington's handling of the Cairo meeting and other Russian requests that it 
will be the one to decide when and where. 
 
Overall, the events of the past fortnight indicate that US-Russian relations are 
rocky at best. As long as Russia claims to perceive US policy as a threat to its 
prestige and security, it will continue to cultivate ties with rogue states in 
exchange for economic and political benefits. Although these types of 
relationships are not new to Russian foreign policy, Washington is faced with the 
difficulty of striking a delicate balance. It wishes to convince Russia of the 
inevitability of NMD -- and an independent US policy -- while providing the 
Kremlin with enough face-saving gestures to maintain a dialogue that will 
facilitate negotiations on other issues when they occur. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
Money changes everything...while this adage applies to many aspects of life, 
both private and public, and no industry is exempt, in the Russian media 
business this concept reigns supreme. 
 
Media-MOST lease on life extended 
The battle over Media-MOST will continue for several months. On 14 February, 
the Moscow Arbitration Court postponed until October Gazprom's suit against 
Media-MOST over the disputed 19-percent stake of NTV. On the following day, 
the representatives of Gazprom and the Ted Turner/George Soros-led 
consortium held talks regarding the consortium's interest in investing at least US 
$300 million in Media-MOST, so as to buy at least a 25-percent stake in NTV. 
However, the meeting appeared to produce no definitive outcome. 
Spokespersons from both Gazprom and the Western investment consortium 
admitted that no agreement was made. What does that mean? Several 
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conclusions are possible. It could mean that Gazprom is conducting stall tactics 
until it can gain a legal controlling stake in NTV, as Gazprom's head, Rem 
Vyakhirev vowed to do "by all means available." It could mean that "while Turner 
initially demanded a guarantee from President Vladimir Putin that the authorities 
will not interfere in NTV's editorial policy, the members of the consortium have 
now come around to the view of Soros, who has spoken of the need to 'take 
Gusinsky out of the game' when it comes to NTV." (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 19 Feb 01) Gusinsky told a Spanish newspaper that he would sell his 
stake in NTV to foreign investors if "it is guaranteed 100 percent that a deal will 
never be reached with the Kremlin authorities that would call into question the 
independence of NTV." (MOSCOW TIMES, 19 Feb 01; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) Conversely, Alfred Kokh, head of Gazprom-Media, 
told the Financial Times after the meeting with Ted Turner and company that he 
might allow the Western investment consortium to purchase a stake in NTV, 
provided that Gusinsky reduced his own stake and that the outside investors not 
form an alliance with other outside investors to retain control. In the same breath 
Kokh said that he doubted sincerely that this would happen. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 
14 Feb 01) 
 
Gazprom's business troubles 
Media-MOST is not the only company experiencing financial difficulty and facing 
foreign investor dilemmas. Gazprom's chief, Rem Vyakhirev, who on 7 February 
took out a full page advertisement in The Wall Street Journal accusing Media-
MOST head Vladimir Gusinsky of both bad faith and negligent management in 
running his company, apparently has been accused of the same thing by 
Gazprom's foreign investors. However, these investors are not in a position to fire 
Vyakhirev, because they "control only two of the eleven seats on Gazprom's 
board of directors, and the government and management control five and four 
seats, respectively." (THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 13 Feb 01) Meanwhile, 
Gazprom is ignoring a legal requirement for an outside audit. Additionally, a 
recent Audit Chamber report on the state-controlled broadcast companies ORT 
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and RTR reveals that both companies are in substantial debt. In ORT's case the 
state repeatedly has extended its $100 million loan from 1998 without penalty. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 27 Jan 01; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
The state's inconsistency of policy with regard to the different media companies 
is significant. Only companies which constitute a political headache to the 
Russian government are expected to take "accountability" for their debts and so-
called mismanagement, while hugely inefficient companies suspected of not 
paying the appropriate taxes lumber along unimpeded. Even more insulting to 
one's intelligence is that Gazprom (that pearl of probity) wants to take over 
control of Media-MOST and, in the words of Vyakhirev, "restore efficient 
management of the company and save the business of Media-MOST from 
otherwise inevitable disintegration." 
 
Have financial pressures at the Moscow Times brought the newspaper to 
heel? 
On 23 January, The Moscow Times published an editorial about the Human 
Rights Congress titled "It's Time to Engage Not to Confront" that baffled regular 
readers. What was confusing was the obvious change in tone of the editorial 
from the previous approach taken by the paper. Traditionally, The Moscow Times 
had not been afraid to publish articles that challenged Putin or the government; 
the newspaper was viewed as the only Western news perspective in Moscow. 
However, the editorial stated "we don't believe that declaring a 'human rights 
state of emergency' is a responsible reaction to the present situation," and "such 
rhetoric merely deepens the divide between the government and liberal forces in 
society, provoking confrontation rather than facilitating a dialogue that could lead 
to real improvements." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 23 Jan 01; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
The eXile, a bi-weekly Moscow-based independent newspaper, published a 
scathing article earlier this month in which the writer Matt Taibbi accused Derk 
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Sauer, head of Independent Media (publisher of The Moscow Times), of selling 
out to the Putin government and opting for "less objectionable editorials." Taibbi 
said that, after Putin's rise to power, Independent Media experienced a raid 
wherein tax inspectors "uncovered" a multi-million-dollar debt owed to the state, 
and that at the same time Sauer "was made to understand that the problem could 
be resolved if the paper's attitude toward Chechnya changed." (THE EXILE, 
Issue #27/108; via www.exile.ru) Since then, Taibbi claims, Independent Media 
has experienced further financial problems and Matthew Bivens, whose editorials 
reportedly were too controversial for Sauer, was forced out of the newspaper. 
Taibbi concluded his article by asking, "Is a march on Prague in the paper's 
future?" 
 
With everything that has been happening in the Russian media industry, Mr. 
Taibbi's question is a good one. Clearly, the state exerts financial and legal 
pressure when it wants to bring a media company to heel, as is evident in the 
struggle for control of Media-MOST. The state ignores the debt and tax problems 
of those companies that act in its interests, as was done with Gazprom, ORT and 
RTR. It is not a stretch to believe that The Moscow Times is fighting a similar 
battle with the state, even if it is less dramatic than the Media-MOST struggle. In 
the case of the Independent Media company, the state does not own any shares, 
but it is in a position to make life uncomfortable financially. In order to make 
money in the newspaper business in Russia, one should not challenge the 
government. Rather, one should write for hire, for whichever politician or 
business will pay the bills, and hope that the state does not decide to audit the 
company.  
 
Money changes everything in the Russian media business, and not in the way it 
does for normal businesses. Russian president Vladimir Putin has voiced the 
opinion that the press "can become truly free only after it achieves economic 
independence." (THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, 14 
Feb 01) But Mr. Putin, if this is so, then why does it seem that the state is doing 
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everything possible to ensure that no media company gains financial 
independence? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
New dog, old tricks. 
In a few areas of the Russian defense establishment, change appears to be in 
the initial stages. The seed for growth of a professional force continues to 
germinate as the final plans are made to initiate the reduction of 90,000 MoD 
civilian personnel outlined last fall. This will be the companion piece to the order 
recently signed by President Putin reducing uniformed military personnel by 
approximately 365,000. Similarly, the arms industry reform efforts begun last 
year are beginning to bear fruit. Military exports in 2000 were up by 34% 
compared to the previous year and the Ural regions of Tyumen, Chelyabinsk and 
Sverdlovsk reported their military, heavy machine industries had experienced 
output growth of between 22% and 49% for the first time in several years. 
(INTERFAX, 1042 GMT, 14 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0214, and RIA, 0810 GMT, 
14 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0214, via World News Connection) However, more 
often than not, old familiar trends of Soviet military policies are reemerging. They 
are manifesting themselves in several ways, including: re-invigorating ties with 
former client states and friends, attempting to reverse the decade of military 
decline and restore military status, developing alignment with "buffer states" 
against perceived threats, and sending mixed messages in the dialogue to 
former Soviet adversaries. 
 
Military efforts continue to lead outreach 
As previously reported (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 31 Jan 01), important 
Russian foreign policy initiatives are essentially of a military nature. Thus, details 
are now emerging of the results of the December visit of Defense Minister 
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Sergeev to Iran. Contracts for reinstated arms sales are expected to be signed 
by the end of the year and are reported to net as much as $300 million per year 
for Russia. (INTERFAX, 1042 GMT, 15 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0215, via World 
News Connection) An upcoming summit visit to Moscow by Iranian President 
Khatami early in March will help to finalize military transfer plans. (ITAR-TASS, 
0843 GMT, 17 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0217, via World News Connection) 
 
Tajikistan 
Russian and Tajik forces held joint command post exercises 15-20 February. 
They involved a Russian motorized infantry division and Russian border guards 
based in Tajikistan. The exercise was held in the vicinity of Dushanbe, where, 
only two days earlier, explosions of suspected terrorist origin shook the Russian 
divisional headquarters. CIS counter-terrorist experts reportedly arrived, 
coincident with the start of the exercises. Also on 13 February, Russian Border 
Guards apparently were involved in a firefight along the Tajik-Afghan border, 
approximately 180 km southeast of Dushanbe. The growing influence the Taliban 
in the region has fostered Moscow's desire to retain significant forces in 
Tajikistan. 
 
India 
Following on the heels of an aircraft deal with India, one of the largest single 
arms export contracts in Russian history, the resurgence of sales to this 
traditional customer and ally continues. In the last two weeks, Russia and India 
signed an agreement to create a joint multi-purpose military aircraft; had a visit 
by Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Anatoli Kornukov, to 
Bangalore, lobbying for Russian contracts to upgrade Indian air defense 
systems; and completed India's purchase of 310 fully equipped Russian T-90 
tanks. Additionally, in the naval arena, Russia's first significant overseas 
deployment of warships since 1996 involves three ships from the Pacific Fleet at 
Vladivostok heading for Mumbay (Bombay) India for an international naval 
parade. Other developments include the recent completion of a "Sword" Class 
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frigate (one of three planned) in the Baltiysky Shipyard, and completion of plans 
to re-fit the carrier "Gorshov," both for transfer to India. 
 
Vietnam 
On their return from India, the three ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet will pay a 
visit to Vietnam. The timing of this visit is conveniently aligned with the opening of 
talks on renewing the Russian lease on the Cam Ranh Bay port facility. It also 
precedes President Putin's visit to Hanoi on 1-2 March. (ITAR-TASS, 1248 GMT, 
16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via World News Connection) 
 
Training and exercises being restored 
In addition to the deployment of Pacific Fleet ships, Russia also held "strategic 
command-and-staff training" from 13-16 February. Included in these exercises 
were three strategic missile launches. (ITAR-TASS, 1521 GMT, 19 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0219) One ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fired from the Barents 
Sea with impact in the Kamchatka Peninsula. (INTERFAX, 1200 GMT, 16 Feb 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via World News Connection) The successful launch of 
a land-based Topol missile may result in a service life extension of the entire 
class of missiles by 5-10 years. (INTERFAX, 1255 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0216, via World News Connection) 
 
Continuing to buttress against NATO in the Near Abroad 
"The incorporation of the Baltic States into NATO directly threatens the security 
interests of Russia," according to a statement by Defense Minister Sergeev. 
(INTERFAX, 1516 GMT, 19 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0219, via World News 
Connection) If NATO continues to expand, "Russia reserves the right to draw the 
corresponding conclusions and take steps to guarantee its own security" 
according to Gen. Leonid Ivashov, head of the defense ministry's International 
Military Cooperation Department. (INTERFAX, 0827 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0216, via World News Connection) As Russia describes continued 
NATO expansion as unacceptable, it maneuvers increasingly to influence and 
 14 
control the former Soviet republics so as to create a "buffer zone." Such 
considerations may have influenced also Russia's decision to participate in the 
NATO Baltic Sea (BALTOPS) 2001 exercise. Russian officials are attending 
planning talks and are rumored to be sending a destroyer to participate this 
summer. If they do, it will be the first time in years that the Russian Navy has 
participated in such an exercise with numerous NATO countries (over 40 ships 
are scheduled to take part). (PAP, 1405 GMT, 7 Feb 01; FBIS-EEU-2001-0207, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Ukraine 
Ukrainian officials recently met with a NATO joint working group on military 
reform. Under discussion was a review of Ukrainian Naval policy and the benefits 
of possibly creating a unified Navy, combining current naval and border force 
coast guard units. Also considered were Ukrainian interests in both the Black 
Sea and the Sea of Azov. (INTELNEWS, 0700 GMT, 7 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0207, via World News Connection) Chafing at NATO involvement in the Ukraine, 
Russia has been very active in pursuing an agenda of gaining widespread 
influence in Ukraine, particularly on security issues. 
 
President Putin, accompanied by dozens of officials (many from military-industrial 
concerns), visited Ukraine on 12 February. In addition to continuing previous 
discussions over the use of Black Sea naval facilities, he and Ukrainian President 
Kuchma signed further agreements on military-technical cooperation to ensure 
mutual access to military supplies and products, and finalized a deal for Ukraine 
to provide several billion rubles worth of components for the Russian shipbuilding 
industries. Included in this agreement are navigation systems, radar, sonar, other 
weapons control systems and gas turbine engines to be used in the export of 
frigates under construction for India as discussed earlier. (ITAR-TASS, 1008 
GMT, 10 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0210, via World News Connection) The two 
leaders, visiting aircraft production facilities that are working on Russian-
Ukrainian projects, also highlighted the aerospace industry. Meanwhile, the two 
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foreign ministers, Igor Ivanov of Russia and Anatoliy Zlenko of Ukraine, worked 
on further details of an issue of interest to both navies -- border definition in the 
Sea of Azov and Straits of Kerch. (ITAR-TASS, 1901 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0216, via World News Connection) 
 
The leader of the national-democratic Ukrainian Narodny Rukh party, Yuriy 
Kostenko, has described the recent Russian visit as an attempt to create greater 
dependency on Moscow and to push Ukraine into a military-political union with 
Russia. He warned that this development was extremely dangerous, given Kyiv's 
existing dependency on Russia for energy sources. (INTERFAX, 1326 GMT, 13 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0213, via World News Connection) 
 
Belarus 
Officials from both countries are completing the military doctrine of the "Russian-
Belarusian union state." Described as "defensive" in nature, this document 
essentially merges the two militaries into a common force. The forging of this tie 
may be linked also to Russia's anticipation of possible accession of the Baltic 
states to NATO. While command-level frameworks are established, Russian and 
Belarusian military design bureaus have completed jointly a raiding and 
reconnaissance vehicle which is well armored and heavily armed -- an attractive 
prospect on the international market. (ITAR-TASS, 0821 GMT, 15 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0215, via World News Connection) 
 
Georgia 
The Georgian Navy commander held meetings with NATO representatives on 7 
February to develop details for the upcoming Partnership of Peace (PfP) 
humanitarian exercise in the Black Sea, hosted by Georgia. Here, too, Russia is 
engaging in many levels of military discussion with Georgia to further Russian 
interests and to counter NATO. On the day of the meeting with the NATO 
delegation, Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze met with the militantly 
anti-Western Russian General Leonid Ivashov. While the issues surrounding the 
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previously agreed Russian troops withdrawals from bases in Georgia and the 
newly imposed Russian visa regime on Georgian citizens remain unresolved, it 
was agreed that military cooperation between the two countries will resume and 
be formalized in a written agreement, expected to be signed in June. 
(INTERFAX, 0818 GMT, 14 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0214, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The ongoing visa dispute between Moscow and Tbilisi could be a sticking point if 
the Russians continue to force visas on Georgian citizens working in Russia. The 
visa regime may have been imposed as a stick to force Georgia to cease 
insisting on Russia honoring the promised withdrawal from military bases in 
Georgia. If the visa problem continues, Georgia has indicated it will reply in kind -
- forcing Russian citizens in Georgia, including military personnel, to return to 
Russia to obtain visas. (GEORGIAN TV1, 1600 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0216, via World News Connection) 
 
Split Dialogue and Rhetoric 
United States 
In scathing remarks, Gen. Ivashov claimed that the US is destabilizing the 
international situation by assuming a global police role and subverting the UN 
Security Council. (ITAR-TASS, 1931 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via 
World News Connection) He went on to call the recent US air strikes in Iraq an 
"affront to international security and the world community" and the Bush 
Administration as "disregard[ing] international and humanitarian standards and 
principles." (INTERFAX, 1925 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via World 
News Connection) Referring to recent statements by US Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, he further 
blamed the US for chilling rhetoric. "We feel as if a cowboy-like assault has been 
made on Russia. A propaganda campaign has been unleashed which is aimed at 
denigrating the role and prestige of the Russian Federation in the international 
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arena." (ITAR-TASS, 0827 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Of course, US National Missile Defense (NMD) plans continue to draw harsh 
words from President Putin, several senior military officers and even former 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Harsh remarks concerning NMD and 
withdrawal from or modification to the 1972 ABM treaty, as well as recent 
strategic missile tests constitute Moscow's public reaction. Yet, subtle signals in 
selected statements hint at a willingness to discuss NMD in the context of arms 
reductions. In fact, President Putin recently stated, "a real threat [is in] the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, aggressive 
separatism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and ecological disasters, which 
might seriously upset strategic stability as a whole." (INTERFAX, 2101 GMT, 7 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0207, via World News Connection) Russian Security 
Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov indicated that Russia and the US could have "a 
calm dialogue" on all issues pertaining to NMD and possible threats from rogue 
states. Commenting on recent Bush Administration statements about new 
weapons development, Ivanov described them as indications that Bush is 
"adapt[ing] to new conditions for the development of their [US] own armed forces. 
There is nothing bad or threatening in this, we [Russia] have also recently 
discussed the improvement of our military organization, taking the future into 
account." (INTERFAX, 1012 GMT, 15 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0215, via World 
News Connection) Major General Vladimir Belous, a professor at the Academy of 
Military Sciences, went so far as to say that, under conditions of stability and 
trust, Russia and the United States could develop missile interceptors jointly for 
use against third countries. (ITAR-TASS, 1447 GMT, 7 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0207, via World News Connection) The mixed signals may indicate the opening 
President Bush needs to engage the Russians in an NMD discussion. Another 
possible service life extension of the Topol missile could become an increasingly 
important factor in the Russian strategic design, by simply having a bigger 
arsenal with which to "bargain" in any possible negotiation. 
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Japan 
General Ivashov stated "we are now actively developing military cooperation with 
our Japanese neighbors." Referring to staff talks planned later in the year, he 
continued, "we are happy to receive them, as both parties have realized the 
benefit" of such contacts. (ITAR-TASS, 1038 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0216, via World News Connection) Despite these sentiments, during exercises 
four Russian bombers and fighters flew directly towards the Japanese island of 
Hokkaido. While the Russians deny it, the aircraft apparently violated Japanese 
airspace, resulting in a scramble of Japanese fighters and a Japanese protest. 
(INTERFAX, 0855 GMT, 14 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0214, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Norway 
On the one hand, the Russians continue to work through contract agreements 
with Norwegian firms to support raising the submarine Kursk from the Barents 
Sea floor this summer, and Defense Minister Sergeev claims that "good 
prospects exist for the development of military ties. In particular, there are 
opportunities to expand contacts between the Russian Northern Fleet and the 
Norwegian Navy, and also between the Leningrad Military District and Norwegian 
land forces." (INTERFAX, 1516 GMT, 19 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0219, via 
World News Connection) On the other hand, a Russian defense ministry source 
was very critical of planned US-Norwegian military exercises at Norway's training 
ground in Halkavarre. The proximity to the Russian border was alleged to be one 
of the main points of Russian concern, according to the source. (INTERFAX, 
1643 GMT, 19 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-0219, via World News Connection) As with the 
Japanese airspace incident, two Russian bombers apparently violated 
Norwegian airspace resulting in a similar response -- scrambled Norwegian 
fighter-interceptors and a protest. (INTERFAX, 1633 GMT, 14 Feb 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0214, via World News Connection) 
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Conclusion 
With military reform efforts initiated in Russia, Moscow's military policies in 
practice continue to resemble Soviet days of old. Russia has actively pressured 
former Soviet republics to blunt the growing call and enthusiasm for accession to 
NATO. Courting former adversaries, where benefit may ensue, the Russians also 
have sent warning signs through sharp rhetoric and actions. Traditionally, this 
tactic is directed at the United States, however, Japan and Norway recently have 
experienced this behavior as well. 
 
Vigorous arms sales to former client states and allies boost the Russian defense 
industry and provide revenue -- both aspects assisting in the repair and reform of 
the Russian armed forces. The naval visits to India and Vietnam also are 
consistent with "show the flag" prestige building and with Russian designs on 
regaining status as a genuine naval power. 
 
Finally, the Russians allege that the Taliban and fundamental Islamic movements 
are threats. With military initiatives in Iran, India and Tajikistan, when looking at 
the map one must also consider the Russian "encirclement" of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as an attempt to isolate these "threats." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Will the communists save Kuchma from the bodyguard? 
Just one week ago, as demonstrations in Ukraine dwindled and Prime Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko indicated his support for President Leonid Kuchma, it seemed 
that "Kuchmagate" was soon to become a part of history. Then, during what The 
New York Times called "a clandestine rendezvous in a Central European 
country," Kuchma's former bodyguard, Mikola Melnichenko, dropped the third 
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and fourth shoes. In an interview with the paper, Melnichenko charged "there is 
no greater criminal in Ukraine than Kuchma," and suggested that his secretly 
recorded audio tapes would show Kuchma's complicity in everything from money 
laundering to the grenade attack on his opponent, Natalia Vitrenko, during the 
recent presidential campaign. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Feb 01) 
 
The interview came as a shock, particularly since things had been going so well 
for Kuchma. Just days before, he had scored a major coup when the Communist 
Party decided not to support a motion that could have led to the ouster of 
Kuchma's prosecutor-general, Mykhaylo Potebenko. Along with Kuchma's 
resignation, Potebenko's removal had been one of the primary demands of anti-
Kuchma protesters. As a staunch opponent of Kuchma, Communist Party leader 
Petro Symonenko was expected to support any measure weakening the 
president's allies. That assumption was obviously wrong. Today, Symonenko has 
become, at least temporarily, Kuchma's de facto partner -- potentially earning for 
his party a place as the most important member of a new parliamentary majority 
coalition. 
 
When a vote of no confidence in Potebenko came before the parliament on 21 
February, the Communist-led leftist parliamentary bloc followed the lead of 
several parties run or supported by Ukraine's most influential oligarchs. They all 
abstained from the vote, saving the job of Potebenko, Kuchma's closest ally 
during the Gongadze investigation. "Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma," wrote 
the Financial Times, "faced with the biggest threat to his rule in more than six 
years in office,... received support from an unexpected quarter: the Communist 
Party."(FINANCIAL TIMES, 22 Feb 01) With that, the communists showed the 
weakness of the center-right parties in parliament, and became the most 
important party of the future in Ukraine. 
 
Soon it became clear that some type of deal may have been reached between 
Kuchma, the businessmen who support him and the communists who want a 
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piece of the action. A new coalition indeed may have been formed. But is this 
coalition truly realistic? And most important, given Melnichenko's revelations, 
does it make any difference? Can a party that advocates a return to central 
planning work effectively with parties run by men who have amassed wealth from 
privatization? Will a leader dependent on grass-roots support help to buttress a 
man who is disgraced in the eyes of the people? 
 
The Communist Party leader is seen by many as Ukraine's equivalent to Russia's 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov -- but without the same willingness 
to embrace euphemism and compromise. Symonenko's Communist Party will 
never be called anything but "Communist." He is unapologetic about his nostalgia 
for the Soviet Union, and proudly advocates reunification with Russia. During the 
1999 presidential election, he campaigned by waving Soviet flags and carrying 
pictures of Stalin. But he can be pragmatic, as evidenced by his actions 
throughout "Kuchmagate." Will he sacrifice some of his Leninist ideology for the 
right price? 
 
Clearly, Kuchma has shown himself willing to concede just about anything to 
maintain power. As the situation becomes more desperate, the concessions 
naturally increase. From social programs to cabinet positions, Symonenko 
undoubtedly has been offered many forms of compensation for his current and 
future support. Whether he will accept them, whether Kuchma and Ukraine can 
really afford to pay them, and whether Melnichenko's latest bombshells make the 
entire point moot, however, are the biggest questions still to be answered.  
 
MOLDOVA 
To Russia with love? 
Payback can be painful, as the president and parliament of Moldova discovered 
on 25 February. They and their parties were summarily trounced -- with many 
ousted from government completely -- when the voters of Moldova held their 
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government responsible for the chaos that has engulfed the country. And who 
can blame them? 
 
For month upon month, the government has concerned itself with nothing but 
power struggles, often resulting in the sabotage of a relatively effective 
government. The need for new parliamentary elections itself was created by 
almost two years of bitter battles between President Petru Lucinschi and various 
parliamentary leaders. When, early in 1999, Lucinschi announced that he would 
hold a referendum to increase his powers at the expense of parliament, 
legislators responded with vigor. They accused the president, probably correctly, 
of attempting to sabotage the work of then-Prime Minister Ion Sturza. Sturza had 
been displaying admirable skill at his job and was enjoying increasing popularity. 
After years of stagnation, Sturza had finally begun to move Moldova forward, and 
had been receiving almost unanimous praise for his government's moves toward 
reform. The IMF had predicted a 2-3 percent rise in GDP for 2000 after years of 
steady decline (INTERFAX, 5 Nov 99; via lexis-nexis) and Sturza had negotiated 
new deals with Moldova's neighbors for electricity delivery. He had reached out 
also, with increasing success, to the EU and NATO. 
 
Then Lucinschi reached out to the communists, helping to form a coalition to 
bring down Sturza's government and plunge his country into the abyss where it 
still resides. Although it might have been possible for the rest of the parties in 
parliament to work together so as to block the communists and support Sturza, 
they chose not to do so. Perhaps the spoils resulting from Sturza's fall were too 
enticing. Sturza's government was toppled. 
 
Shortly thereafter, when Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin, who showed 
himself a master at political strategy throughout this entire affair, decided that 
Lucinschi was no longer useful, he switched sides and helped his colleagues to 
create a parliamentary republic. With that, Lucinschi was gone. All that remained 
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was for Voronin to wait for the rest of the parties in Moldova's parliament to prove 
unable to form a ruling coalition. He didn't have to wait long. 
 
So now the communists control Moldova. Voronin has declared his intention to 
form a union with Russia and Belarus. Will the two Slav countries want Moldova? 
And would Romania quietly accept this? As usual, much remains in flux and 
unclear. Voronin has suggested that he will govern based on pragmatism, not 
ideology. "If it is in the state's interest to privatize, we will privatize. If it is in the 
state's interest to nationalize, we will nationalize." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 26 
Feb 01; via America Online) 
 
Meanwhile, the IMF and EU are practically throwing money at Moldova, perhaps 
hoping to persuade the Communist Party to maintain ties with the West. Perhaps 
their strategy will be successful. Or perhaps Moldova will be absorbed into the 
Russia-Belarus "union." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Why publish the OSCE texts? 
All segments of Azerbaijani society swiftly condemned three OSCE proposals 
dating from 1997 and 1998 once the texts were "leaked" by the Azerbaijani 
foreign ministry to the official newspaper, Azerbaycan, which published them on 
21 February. 
 
The July 1997 proposal represents the so-called "package approach" which 
attempts to resolve all the outstanding issues in one document. In the 
phraseology of that draft, "Nagorno-Karabakh is a state and territorial formation 
within the confines (v sostave) of Azerbaijan." OSCE peacekeepers would be 
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introduced to facilitate the return of refugees and to police the Lachin corridor 
which connects Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The second proposal, from 
December 1997, the so-called "phased approach," would provide security 
guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh and return some Armenian-occupied districts 
(east of Nagorno-Karabakh) to Azerbaijan and then begin talks on the status 
question. [For in-depth analysis, see Gerard Libaridian, THE CHALLENGE OF 
STATEHOOD: ARMENIAN POLITICAL THINKING SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
(Crane Books: 1999). For a brief summary of the texts published last week, see 
RFE/RL CAUCASUS REPORT, 23 Feb 01.] The third proposal, the "common 
state" put forth in November 1998, would grant Nagorno-Karabakh virtually all the 
attributes of an independent state and anchor it in a loose confederation with 
Azerbaijan. (BAKINSKI RABOCHI, 21 February 01; BBC Monitoring, via 
habarlar-1@usc.edu) 
 
The immediate effect of the publication has been to consolidate Azerbaijani 
public opinion in opposition to accepting the terms proposed in the three 
documents. "The authorities have finally come to appreciate the need for gaining 
or even leaning on public support," commented Azarbaycan on 21 February. 
(BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) Statements from refugee groups, parliamentary 
and non-parliamentary opposition, and Azerbaijani experts all leave no doubt that 
the bilateral talks to be held in Paris on 4 March hold out no promise of success. 
 
The more than 40 political parties condemned the proposals, which also came 
under scrutiny in parliament on 23 February. (RFE/RL AZERBAIJAN SERVICE, 
23 Feb 01) One after another, the representatives of the democratic opposition 
stood up in parliament and called for a military solution. (ANS, 1700 GMT, 24 
Feb 01; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) As compared with 
them, President Heydar Aliev looked like a dovish senior statesman as he 
announced through his former adviser and Azerbaijan's most highly regarded 
foreign policy expert, Vafa Guluzade, merely that no peace agreement would be 
signed in Paris. (TURAN, 1400 GMT, 24 Feb 01; via lexis-nexis) All of this 
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posturing and maneuvering is cast against the background of hunger-striking 
invalid veterans being forcibly removed from the protest, arrested and 
denounced. 
 
Responding to Aliev's invitation for political parties to submit their own proposals, 
Etibar Mammadov, the leader of the opposition, Party for National Independence 
of Azerbaijan (PNIA), set out the party program for regulating the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. (TURAN, 1603 GMT, 26 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0226, via 
World News Connection) The demands of the opposition are much tougher than 
those pursued by the present government. They are: 
 
--Unconditional liberation of the occupied territories and the return of the 
Azerbaijani population; 
--If Armenia refuses to recognize Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, then talks with 
Armenia should cease; 
--Turkey should be made a Minsk group co-chair to balance those co-chairs with 
influential Armenian lobby groups. (This refers to the recent recognition of the 
Armenian genocide by the French parliament); 
--Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh's status can begin only after refugees return to 
their homes. 
 
According to an Armenian paper (ARAVOT, 21 Feb 01; BBC Monitoring, via 
harbarlar-1@usc.edu) the third proposal, the so-called "common state" formula, 
has not been altered since 1998. That plan is the brainchild of Yevgeni Primakov, 
former Russian spy-master and prime minister, remembered in Baku chiefly for 
his leading role in the massacre of Azerbaijani civilians by Soviet military and 
special forces on 20 January 1990. This proposal begins with the following 
principle: "Nagorny-Karabakh is a state and territorial entity in the form of a 
republic and forms a common state with Azerbaijan within its internationally 
recognized borders." (BAKINSKI RABOCHI, 21 Feb 01; BBC Monitoring, via 
harbarlar-1@usc.edu) Under this formulation, therefore, Nagorno-Karabakh is a 
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state but Azerbaijan is not! That the "common state" idea has not been modified 
since November 1998 may mean only that it hasn't been discussed since then.  
 
While they certainly expose the pro-Armenian slant of the OSCE approach, the 
1997 and 1998 texts are not clearly relevant for the present negotiations. In 
theory, all three proposals remain on the table, if the sides wish to discuss them. 
That does not mean that any of the drafts provide the basis for the bilateral talks, 
at present mediated by France's President Jacques Chirac. Moreover, the text 
that seemed to have the greatest potential for success remains secret. Progress 
on the framework agreement developed by Presidents Heyder Aliev and Robert 
Kocharian in 1999 with US mediation was derailed by the assassinations in the 
Armenian parliament in October 1999. The publication of that text and 
subsequent modifications would give observers an opportunity to compare 
proposals and provide a more accurate picture of the range of available 
possibilities. 
 
Another immediate (and perhaps not so coincidental) development is the 
postponement of the summit of Caspian states, at Iran's request, which had been 
scheduled for next week. That meeting, a follow-up to the Putin-Aliev summit 
which was held in January 2001, was expected to approve a legal regime for the 
Caspian Sea that would facilitate progress towards the construction of the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Budanov goes on trial 
On 27 March 2000, Col. Yuri Budanov, recipient of the Order of Courage award, 
abducted at gunpoint an 18-year-old Chechen woman, Kheda Kungaeva, from 
her home, took her to his trailer, beat her, and then strangled her. That much is 
beyond dispute. However, Budanov maintains that Kungaeva was a sniper who 
had killed some of his men. According to Budanov, she tried to fight him during 
the interrogation, so he lost control and strangled her. On those grounds major 
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Moscow papers defend Budanov and a London-based reporting network 
suggests that he's a sacrificial lamb. (IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING 
SERVICE, 23 Feb 01) Could it be true that there was an element of self-defense 
to Budanov's actions? The Budanov case boils down to the ugly question: Was 
Kheda Kungaeva raped before or after she was murdered? According to forensic 
evidence obtained by Human Rights Watch, she was raped an hour before her 
death. (www.hrw.org) 
 
Mass graves contain bodies of 'disappeared' 
In a statement circulated on 27 February, Human Rights Watch called for an 
urgent international investigation of a mass grave found near Khankala, the main 
Russian military base in Chechnya. Law enforcement authorities cordoned off the 
site after the grave was found to contain bodies of people who had "disappeared" 
from military custody during the last year. 
 
"The mass grave discovered near Khankala is not the first unmarked grave to be 
found in Chechnya. Throughout the past six months, unmarked graves 
containing the bodies of people who had previously 'disappeared' in the custody 
of Russian troops were found in several villages, including Starye Atagi, Dzhalka, 
Gekhi, Duba-Yurt and Mesker-Yurt. Many of the bodies had been severely 
mutilated. Injuries commonly found on these bodies included broken limbs, 
scalped body parts, cut off fingertips, knife and gunshot wounds. " 
(www.hrw.org.) 
 
Market-oriented camps 
Anna Politkovskaya, the Novaya gazeta journalist who was detained, threatened 
and humiliated by FSB officers in the Vedeno region while documenting the plight 
of Chechen civilians, published her account of the ordeal, "The concentration 
camp with a commercial slant," on 26 February. Politkovskaya's story 
corroborates numerous testimonies from Chechen survivors of those camps who 
recount beatings, rapes, torture and inhuman conditions. 
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Politkovskaya reportedly was seized by FSB agents who subjected her to sexual 
harassment, intimidation and attempted provocation, after she conducted an 
interview with the commander of the 45th Airborne Regiment. That colonel 
(whom she does not identify by name) told her that he was tired of the war and 
would be grateful if the civilians started doing their part and let him go home to 
his family. He showed her pits in the ground, six meters deep, where Chechens 
are held after they are seized in "cleansings." The colonel explained that the 
practice was initiated at the behest of General Baranov, the commander of the 
group of forces, who inspected the base and suggested that the pits they dug for 
garbage be used for prisoners. The colonel did not deny that Chechens held at 
the base were ransomed from the federal forces by their families. 
 
Immediately after this interview, the FSB officers detained her without making 
any formal charges. They dismissed her press credentials, claiming that Basaev 
had paid off Yastrzhembsky and that Politkovskaya was herself a fighter. Later 
she was threatened with execution and told that her children would suffer. She 
was released after an FSB agent delivered her to the main base at Khankala, 
where military inspectors took charge of her case. Politkovskaya's story 
emphasizes the unresolved competition between the FSB and the military. It 
sounds very much as if the colonel were trying to tell a story and the FSB was 
trying to stop him. The way in which Politkovskaya portrays them, the colonel is 
experienced, decent, and reasonable, while the FSB agents are immature, 
arrogant, emotionally unbalanced thugs. 
 
Another incident related by Politkovskaya deserves mention. Vakha, a former 
security services officer who now collects information about atrocities in 
Chechnya, related the following to her: Shamil Basaev and his brigade stayed in 
his village, Tovszeni. The residents hoped that, at last, Basaev would be 
arrested, but quite the opposite transpired. Federal forces were pulled back until 
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after the fighters had retreated into the mountains. Only when Basaev left, did the 
military start "cleansing" the villagers who had no connection to Basaev. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Western attempts to foster stability include non-military efforts 
Western assistance to the Central Asian states is not limited to military exercises 
under NATO auspices. Additional support comes from institutions such as the 
Marshall Center, which assists the Central Asian states in their efforts to 
establish national security structures, foster regional cooperation and resolve 
security problems. Thus, the Kyrgyzstan International Institute for Strategic 
Studies and the George C. Marshall Center organized a seminar on civil-military 
relations in Bishkek from 29 January-1 February to discuss Kyrgyz security 
issues. 42 Kyrgyz officials from the parliament, news media, and ministries of 
defense, interior and foreign affairs discussed the military and society, including 
parliament's role in formulating national security policy and exercising democratic 
control of military forces. The Kyrgyzstan civil-military relations seminar 
underscored the Marshall Center's long-held goal of enhancing stability in Central 
Asia. 
 
The seminar featured presentations by experts from France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States on the role of 
legislatures and military institutions in democratic societies. The conference gave 
both civilian and military officials a unique opportunity to exchange ideas with all 
sides agreeing on the need to establish a "broad-based dialogue" on 
Kyrgyzstan's armed forces and defense policy. The group also recommended 
enhancing parliamentary oversight of defense policy and the armed forces, in 
addition to involving the public in the military reform process, improving soldiers' 
quality of life and restoring prestige to military service. (Marshall Center 
 30 
CONFERENCE SUMMARY, 1 Feb 01) Indeed, establishing an apolitical, 
professional military capable of responding to regional crisis, including 
humanitarian assistance, should be a priority. 
 
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, based in 
Garmisch, Germany, was established in November 1992 under the United States 
European Command to expand defense and security contacts with the emerging 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. It will be coordinating 
the Central Asia Regional Security Conference in Kazakhstan in June. Last 
year's conference on "Promoting Stability in Central Asia" in Tashkent brought 
together officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 
assessing the potential for regional conflict. (Marshall Center PRESS RELEASE, 
10 May 00) Central Asia is beleaguered by security problems such as 
international terrorism and drug trafficking. Porous and unstable borders in 
addition to the war in Afghanistan are continuous sources of instability. Additional 
problems come from the Central Asian countries themselves. The Center's Dr. 
Roger D. Kangas, a Central Asia expert, explained that "the state-building 
problems of the five states resemble those of other post-colonial countries. Their 
histories prior to the Soviet period did not revolve around entities called 
'Uzbekistan,' 'Kazakhstan,' etc. ... thus the current leaders must establish what it 
is to be a [modern] state. ... Quite frankly, they are starting from scratch and it's a 
difficult process." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Moscow taketh, and Moscow giveth away... 
A 10 February meeting between Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in Austria appeared to go fairly well, although 
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subsequent statements by other Russian officials make it quite clear that 
progress in terms of improving relations will continue to be halting, at best. 
 
The meeting between the two presidents proceeded smoothly in large part 
because few issues of contention were discussed. "Mr. Putin said that the NATO 
issue was very complicated and that during the first meeting it would be better to 
put it aside and not talk about it," Vike-Freiberga said after the meeting. (BNS, 
2200 GMT, 10 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0211, via World News Connection). 
Acceding to Putin's wish to skip a discussion of NATO was unproblematic, since 
Russia's stated opposition to the alliance's expansion has not stopped Baltic 
aspirations to be part of that expansion. 
 
Vike-Freiberga gave no ground on the topic of the recent spate of war crimes 
trials (of former KGB officers) being held in Latvia, as she asserted that there 
was no way to exert political influence upon judicial proceedings in her country. 
(BNS, 2216 GMT, 10 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0211, via World News 
Connection) As to the treatment of ethnic Russians in Latvia, in the classic pas 
de deux of diplomacy, both participants left the talks persuaded that he/she had 
gained the upper hand. Putin reportedly told Vike-Frieberga that ethnic Russian 
residents continued to experience difficulties, reiterating -- in a watered-down 
manner -- a claim Russia often makes. Without contradicting Putin, the Latvian 
president said she was ready "to do everything possible to ensure the 
observance of internationally recognized human rights standards." Since she has 
stated previously her belief that Latvia already is meeting such standards, Vike-
Frieberga was conceding little when she offered that assurance to Putin. "I am 
ready to help those experiencing problems, especially elderly people who find it 
difficult to get adjusted to a new setting," she added. (INTERFAX, 0659 GMT, 11 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0211, via World News Connection) The important part 
of that intended-to-be-reassuring statement, of course, is that help will be 
provided to those persons trying to adjust, as opposed to those attempting to 
create their own Russian enclave on Latvian soil.  
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The latter concept was proven to be very much a real issue when Garold 
Astakhov, a member of Latvia's Russian Community, decried the end of 
international monitoring of the human rights situation. Astakhov explained the 
reasoning behind his letter to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE), providing an interesting perspective on the continued difficulties 
Latvia will face with members of its ethnic Russian minority. "We pointed out the 
mass lack of citizenship, violations of freedom of speech (even private television 
and radio companies are required to broadcast in Latvian for 80 percent of their 
total broadcast time) ... arbitrary alteration of names and surnames of 
representatives of ethnic minorities...," he said. The community seeks the 
unconditional grant of citizenship to all residents who lived in the country in 1991, 
Astakhov said. "We see the 'zero option' as the only right and fair solution in our 
situation, without any dues, vows, humiliating promises of loyalty," he added. 
(BNS, 1101 GMT, 7 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0207, via World News Connection) 
The truly compelling question, of course, is why anyone would want to become a 
citizen of a country when he would view a pledge of allegiance to that country as 
"humiliating." 
 
While Putin's participation in the talks may have signaled a willingness to re-open 
dialogue with the Baltic states, in no way did it indicate an end to the rhetoric 
spewing forth from Moscow. A statement released by the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs asserted that, with the prosecution of defendants charged with 
war crimes, "an atmosphere of ideological persecution is being whipped up in 
Latvia," adversely affecting Russo-Latvian relations. (ITAR-TASS, 1423 GMT, 12 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0212, via World News Connection) Moreover, Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeev warned that the Latvian mass media 
had misinterpreted the ramifications of the presidents' meeting. Aleksandrs 
Bartasevics, a Latvian MP who met with Avdeev, reported Avdeev's assertion 
that politicians and the media had exaggerated hopes about a changed Russian 
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attitude on issues of contention between the two states. (BNS, 1836 GMT, 15 
Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0215, via World News Connection) 
  
How big is the Russian hurdle to NATO aspirants? 
Lest any of the other Baltic states think that the road to the West is one-
directional, the NATO deputy secretary-general recently reminded all of the need 
to look both ways -- westward and eastward -- before attempting to cross. Klaus-
Peter Klaiber told Estonian officials that, while their country is making good 
progress toward NATO, Tallinn also must promote good relations with Russia, 
which remains an important factor in the maintenance of European security. 
(ETA NEWS AGENCY, 1800 GMT, 9 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0210, via World 
News Connection) The importance of Russia as an obstacle to NATO expansion, 
however, remains open to debate. Certainly, Russian officials are working 
actively to convince the West that Moscow's anti-expansion stand constitutes an 
insurmountable hurdle. As NATO Secretary-General George Robertson prepared 
to visit Moscow and assuage Russian concerns about possible Baltic 
membership in the military alliance, a representative of the defense ministry 
looked for a sword to rattle. If the West were to ignore Moscow's protests and 
allow the Baltic states into NATO, General Leonid Ivashov warned, "Russia 
reserves the right to adopt corresponding conclusions and steps to guard its own 
security." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 16 Feb 01; via nexis-lexis) 
  
Indeed, an even bigger sword was rattled by Russian MP Dmitri Rogozin, 
chairman of the Duma's Committee on International Affairs. Russian-Estonian 
relations would be ruined if that Baltic state were to accede to NATO. Lest he be 
considered too subtle in his threats, Rogozin explained how the relations would 
deteriorate: "Nonstrategic missiles and long-distance artillery would be targeted 
on Estonia... All strategic NATO sites -- bridges, airfields, power plants, ports, 
administrative buildings -- would become targets for them. Would these 
measures by the Russian military add anything positive to our relations? I'm not 
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convinced of it." (BNS, 1354 GMT, 16 Feb 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via World 
News Connection) 
 
In light of such statements, it will be interesting to see if Moscow continues to 
assert that the Baltic states don't need Western guarantees of security, and if 
anyone in the West believes such assertions. 
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